BURMA – THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
I’d like to thank the Commission for the opportunity to give evidence here today. We have heard from Charm Tong, Nurul Islam and Guy Horton about the atrocities being committed in Burma. I’ll now try to outline how the international community has responded.
Burma is unique in that it has a democratically elected government that has never been allowed to take power. At elections held in 1990 the National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won 82 percent of seats in Parliament. It was an overwhelming mandate from the people. The regime’s response was to clamp down even harder on the democracy movement, arresting and torturing MPs and democracy activists. The democracy movement called on the international community for assistance. To the shame of governments and the United Nations, that call has largely fallen on deaf ears.
The Burma Campaign UK was set up in response to that call for international support. We have sister organisations in over 20 countries around the world. Our mandate is to campaign for human rights and democracy in Burma, and we follow the lead of Burma’s democracy movement in matters of policy, such as the demand for targeted economic sanctions.
People often make a lot of assumptions about campaign demands made by the democracy movement, especially regarding sanctions. I am pleased to have this opportunity to state on the record what we are actually calling on the international community to do.
Following the 1990 elections the regime was vulnerable. They were in shock about the result of the election, being so out of touch they honestly thought the parties they sponsored would win. Large parts of the country were not controlled by the regime, They faced a variety of armed organisations within Burma’s borders, mainly groups who had taken up arms in response to brutal attacks on ethnic minorities by the military. Aung San Suu Kyi was regularly in the news, drawing attention to what was happening in the country. There was deep hostility to the regime throughout the country. The economy was in ruins, following years of economic isolation. Burma had gone from being one of the richest countries in Asia to one of the poorest. The army itself was badly trained, and had ageing equipment, some of it decades old. The regime was in trouble, and it knew it.
To cling on to power the generals knew they had to strengthen the army. They set a target of doubling the size of the army to half a million soldiers. But they needed money to do it. They accelerated plans to open up the economy to foreign trade and investment. After decades of economic isolation, international investors flooded into the country, eager for access to Burma’s rich natural resources, such as oil, gas, timber and gems. Investment was encouraged that would maximise revenue for the regime, for example companies were forced to enter joint ventures with regime owned companies.
In most countries trade and investment can benefit ordinary people, but in Burma the opposite proved to be the case. The influx of investment and increasing exports boosted revenue for the regime. Military spending increased to such a degree that in most years it now makes up to half of government spending. At the same time the regime reduced spending on health and education. According to figures from the Asian Development Bank and United Nations, as a percentage of GDP Burma now spends less on health than any other country in the world. And while a few people in major cities saw an increase in income, overall people in Burma were becoming poorer. The increased capacity of the army also allowed the regime to step up its war against ethnic nationalities, as the others speakers have described. Nor did the increased contact with the outside world lead to any political reforms, quite the opposite.
The democracy movement saw this trade and investment flooding in, and rather than helping people it was hurting them by helping to entrench military rule. It was only then, in the mid 1990s, that serious calls for economic sanctions began.
And here we come to one of the myths about Burma and sanctions. Myth Number One: There is a call for a blanket boycott. There is not. Most of the democracy movement is calling for is targeted economic sanctions. That means targeting the key sectors that earn the regime most of its revenue. In particular this has been joint ventures, oil, gas, timber and gems. Clothing exports and tourism were also targeted because of human rights concerns and the amount of revenue they earn the regime. Around 75 percent of Burma’s population are subsistence farmers. These kind of sanctions would have no negative impact on them. There is no demand for Iraqi-style sanctions. Nor are we calling for a blanket boycott like there was against Apartheid South Africa. You can go into a supermarket today and buy organic mung beans from Burma and no-one is making a fuss about it. The demands for sanctions are targeted to hit the regime where it will hurt them most, in their pockets, and minimise any negative impact on ordinary Burmese people.
Another absolutely key factor here is that it is Burmese people who are asking for sanctions. The call for sanctions didn’t originate from the Burma Campaign UK. It came from inside Burma, from people who where experiencing first hand the consequences of a regime with increased resources. And given the extraordinary diversity of Burma with its different ethnic groups and myriad political parties, the unity that there is around the call for targeted sanctions is extraordinary, much more so than any other campaign I have been involved with. As far as the Burma Campaign UK is concerned, it is their call. They called for these targeted sanctions. They are willing to make sacrifices if that is what it takes to bring down this regime, just as we were when threatened with Nazi rule during World War Two.
In response to this call democracy campaign groups like the Burma Campaign UK launched high profile campaigns against companies operating in Burma, and began lobbying governments for sanctions. No government responded positively.
Which brings us to Myth Number Two. Sanctions have been tried and have failed. The first sanction of any consequence was in 1997, when the United States introduced a ban on new investment in Burma. It was a very welcome step. However, it didn’t apply to investment already made, such as that by UNOCAL, where horrific human rights abuses were committed during the construction of their pipeline. By 1997, with all the publicity around campaigns against companies in Burma, US companies didn’t want to invest there anyway.
The European Union, however, wasn’t even prepared to go that far.
EU members are committed to a common foreign policy on Burma. In theory, this could be highly effective, with all 25 EU members working together to help bring democratic reform in Burma. In fact, we are left with the lowest common denominator, and a weak and ineffective response that has had no impact on the regime. As all 25 EU members have to agree on sanctions or any issue, it only takes one country to say no, and then nothing happens.
Current EU measures against Burma include:
An arms embargo
This is of course welcome, but there is no worldwide arms embargo and the regime buys most of its arms from China and Russia.
A ban on non-humanitarian aid
Again welcome, but not a measure that has a serious impact on the regime.
An end to GSP trade privileges
Again, no significant economic impact on the regime.
A visa ban for senior regime officials and their families
Otherwise known as the shopping ban, as exemptions in the visa ban allow regime officials to attend many international meetings in Europe. As the British foreign office has admitted, regime officials rarely came to Europe anyway.
A freeze of assets held in Europe by people on the visa ban list
Less than £4,000 has been frozen in all 25 EU member states, again hardly a measure to bring the regime to its knees.
A limited investment ban
This measure was introduced in 2004. The point of an investment ban is to stop revenue going to the regime, much of which will be spent on the military. If you are going to do this you have a choice, the nice and simple option - a ban on all new investment – as the USA has done – or you could target investment in key sectors of the economy that earn the regime money, such as oil, gas, gems and mining. The EU did the exact opposite. European companies are banned from investing in a small number of named state-owned enterprises. These state-owned companies mentioned are largely insignificant. None of the companies listed are involved in the areas that earn the regime any significant revenue. The timber, mining, oil and gas sectors are not included. However, European companies are banned from investing in a pineapple juice factory and a tailor shop. To cap it all, it is already illegal to invest in state-owned enterprises under Burmese law, so the EU banned something that couldn’t happen anyway.
On the political front the European Union is just as hopeless. It does not appear to have any clear political strategy on how to tackle the crisis in Burma. In this policy vacuum they have turned instead to focussing on increasing humanitarian assistance to Burma. This is very welcome, the need is great, but you can’t just tackle the symptoms, you have to target the cause of the problems in Burma as well, and that is the regime.
The government of France is one of the biggest obstacles to a stronger European position on Burma, in large part because they are worried about sanctions damaging Total Oil, the French oil company operating in Burma. In effect the interests of one French oil company help to dictate the foreign policy of all 25 EU member states.
On Thursday the EU Common Position on Burma is expected to be rolled over for a further year. There do not appear to be any plans to strengthen it. It is astonishing that the EU would effectively send a signal that nothing needs to be done at a time when the regime has stepped up attacks on its own population, shooting children and even beheading civilians.
As a member of the EU Britain is bound by the EU Common Position, but that does not mean it cannot act unilaterally. There is a lot more the British government could do.
The UK remains amongst the strongest critics within the EU of Burma’s authorities. The UK does not encourage trade, investment or tourism with Burma. It does not offer any commercial services for companies wanting to do business with Burma, or financial support for trade promotion activities or the organising of trade missions.
The government backed two campaigns by the Burma Campaign UK, calling on British American Tobacco and Premier Oil to withdraw from Burma. Both did so.
The government also played a vital role in bringing Burma to the UN Security Council for the first time last year.
Britain ranks as the second largest source of approved investment in Burma. China ranks 16th. The reason for this is not just because of massive investment by British companies. It is because companies all over the world use Britain to invest in Burma via the dependent territories. Tax benefits and the lack of transparency make the British Virgin Islands and Bermuda the perfect place for investors wanting to do business with the regime. The lack of transparency makes it hard to identify all the companies involved, but we are aware of companies from across Europe, from the USA, from Hong Kong and even Thailand that have used British territory to invest in Burma, and the British government has done nothing to stop it. This is despite overwhelming parliamentary support for an investment ban. In 2003 243 MPs signed an Early Day Motion calling for an investment ban, including more than 100 Labour backbenchers. All the main political parties in the UK support an investment ban, except Labour.
British trade unions have also called for an investment ban, and the CBI wants the government to clarify its position. Companies argue the government is inconsistent asking companies not to invest when it is perfectly legal to do so. To ban investment the government needs to introduce a small piece of legislation giving them to power to do so. Given the cross-party support this should not be a problem. To be helpful we have even had it drafted for them. It’s just a page and a half long.
A recent parliamentary question revealed DFID does not finance any projects promoting democracy in Burma. Nor is financial support given to key Burmese democracy organisations, such as the government in exile, National Council of the Union Burma, the trade union movement, or the Democratic Voice of Burma radio and TV stations, which broadcast news into Burma and play a vital role in informing people what is happening in the country. The government has, however, spent £120,000 on a survey of wild bats in Burma.
Without doubt the most important thing the government can do is bring Burma back to the UN Security Council. It is astonishing that the Council only held its first debate on Burma in December last year. There is not even a UN arms embargo against this regime.
Last year Vaclav Havel and Desmond Tutu commissioned a report from the respected global law firm DLA Piper. It found Burma does fit the criteria for UN Security Council intervention. The American government committed itself to bringing Burma to the Council, and after a short delay - and significant parliamentary pressure – the British government threw its weight behind the initiative. In December the UN held an informal briefing on the situation in Burma. This is very welcome but it is just a first step. The regime is terrified of Security Council action, and it is the only body that has the power to require the regime to begin a process of restoring democracy. We have to take this process forward. We need a binding resolution. It takes nine votes to get Burma onto the agenda of the Security Council. We need Britain actively engaged in securing those votes. Over 250 MPs are calling on the government to do so. Demark has the Presidency of the UNSC in June and is a strong supporter of Burma’s democracy movement. Their Presidency would be a good opportunity for such discussions.
The other section of the international community that plays a vital role is of course Asia. But despite significant new investment from China and India there have recently been dramatic changes in Asian countries’ attitudes towards Burma. India is unfortunately peddling as fast as it can in the wrong direction, providing investment and loans and pursuing a completely uncritical policy. A surprising attitude for the world’s largest democracy to take.
In other areas though there is cause for optimism. Since 2003 China has made public statements encouraging the regime to reform. China wants Burma’s gas, but it is not happy with its government. A recent Burmese delegation to China was hoping to secure many new loans, but was sent home empty-handed.
But perhaps the most significant change has been from ASEAN, ASEAN has gone from being a shield for the regime to a thorn in its side. Last year, unable to stomach the prospect of Burma having the ASEAN presidency, Burma was forced to miss its turn. Then in December ASEAN effectively abandoned its policy of non-interference in Burma, demanded change and to send a delegation to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi. The regime was forced to admit the delegation, but refused to allow them to meet Aung San Suu Kyi. ASEAN is still a long way from having any effective strategy for dealing with Burma, but what has already happened would have been unimaginable two years ago.
The third big myth about Burma is that the regime is isolationalist, and that it does not respond to pressure. No-one is trying to isolate the regime, not democracy campaigners, and certainly not the regime itself. It depends on international trade and investment for its survival. It works very hard to increase international trade and diplomatic contacts. Every year it opens new embassies, not the action of a regime trying to isolate itself. It recently revamped all government websites to present its case to the world, and has set up a TV channel available on satellite with programmes on how happy everyone in Burma is. It is building new roads to increase its exports, and has spent millions upgrading its airports.
And as for pressure not working, what pressure has there been? A lot of rhetoric from the West, but the generals ruling Burma are brutal killers, they are not afraid of a bit of hot air or bad press. With the exception of the US investment ban, no serious political or economic pressure was put on the regime until 2003. In 2003, following the latest arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, the USA introduced a ban on financial transactions and an import ban. In 2003 China voiced dissatisfaction publicly for the first time. Other countries that had turned a blind eye to the situation are also becoming more vocal. The Australian foreign minister recently described progress to democracy in Burma as being like glue flowing up hill. In 2005 ASEAN finally lost patience with the regime, and also in 2005 there was the first ever debate on Burma at the UN Security Council.
Things are finally starting to happen, and we must keep the pressure on. Burma must be brought back to the UN Security Council. So far the international community has failed the people of Burma, ignored Aung San Suu Kyi’s call - please use your liberty to promote ours. Burma’s generals have locked Aung San Suu Kyi in her house, cut her phone and intercept her post in an effort to silence her. The international community must answer her call.
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